Preface to Chapter 1
Preface to Chapter 1
Introduction
Preface to Chapter 1
Being Two-Faced over Counterparty Credit Risk
Risky Funding: A Unified Framework for Counterparty and Liquidity Charges
DVA for Assets
Pricing CDSs’ Capital Relief
The FVA Debate
The FVA Debate: Reloaded
Regulatory Costs Break Risk Neutrality
Risk Neutrality Stays
Regulatory Costs Remain
Funding beyond Discounting: Collateral Agreements and Derivatives Pricing
Cooking with Collateral
Options for Collateral Options
Partial Differential Equation Representations of Derivatives with Bilateral Counterparty Risk and Funding Costs
In the Balance
Funding Strategies, Funding Costs
The Funding Invariance Principle
Regulatory-Optimal Funding
Close-Out Convention Tensions
Funding, Collateral and Hedging: Arbitrage-Free Pricing with Credit, Collateral and Funding Costs
Bilateral Counterparty Risk with Application to Credit Default Swaps
KVA: Capital Valuation Adjustment by Replication
From FVA to KVA: Including Cost of Capital in Derivatives Pricing
Warehousing Credit Risk: Pricing, Capital and Tax
MVA by Replication and Regression
Smoking Adjoints: Fast Evaluation of Monte Carlo Greeks
Adjoint Greeks Made Easy
Bounding Wrong-Way Risk in Measuring Counterparty Risk
Wrong-Way Risk the Right Way: Accounting for Joint Defaults in CVA
Backward Induction for Future Values
A Non-Linear PDE for XVA by Forward Monte Carlo
Efficient XVA Management: Pricing, Hedging and Allocation
Accounting for KVA under IFRS 13
FVA Accounting, Risk Management and Collateral Trading
Derivatives Funding, Netting and Accounting
Managing XVA in the Ring-Fenced Bank
XVA: A Banking Supervisory Perspective
An Annotated Bibliography of XVA
In “Being two-faced over counterparty credit risk” (Gregory 2009) the main, and highly influential, result was that the credit value adjustment (CVA) calculated by one counterparty was exactly the debt value adjustment calculated by the other counterparty. This result was widely applauded as preserving symmetry in pricing. In his conclusion, Jon Gregory identifies the key concern about bilateral counterparty risk: “should, therefore, an institution post profits linked to their own worsening credit quality?”. This concern was also widely echoed going forward.
This paper provoked the question of whether symmetry was actually present when there were funding costs as well as default risk. This leads to Chapter 2, “Risky funding with counterparty and liquidity charges” (Morini and Prampolini 2011), where the intuition of asymmetry and funding is developed.
A further refinement came with the realisation that if only derivatives are considered and if the focus is changed from own-credit spread to own-funding costs, then this can be, and is, routinely monetised by institutions that are short cash, ie, most banks, because funding benefits reduce borrowing requirements (see Chapter 15
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