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Portable alphaand beta forlong/shortequity manager
Avoiding the pitfalls ofunintentional market, sectorand style bets
While stock-picking strategies are, in principle,
meant to exploit evidence of predictability in individual
stock-specific risk, equity managers, as a
result of their bottom-up security selection decisions,
often end up making discretionary, and
most of the time unintended, bets on market,
sector and style returns as much as they make
bets on individual stock returns.
These unintended bets are unfortunate as they
can have a dramatic impact either way on the
portfolio return, and their presence introduces an
undesirable element of luck in the performancegenerating
process. Consider, for example, the
case of long/short equity managers. The vast
majority favour stock-picking as a way to generate
abnormal return. Long/short managers do
not actively manage their market exposure, and
most of them end up having a net long bias.
This can be seen from the correlation of HFR
Equity Hedge (a prominent index for long/short
hedge fund managers) with the S&P500, which
turns out to be equal to 0.63 based on monthly
data over the period 1990-2000. This is due to the
fact that these managers, most of them being
originally long-only mutual fund managers, typically
feel more comfortable at detecting undervalued
stocks than overvalued stocks.
This long bias, which is not the result of an active
bet on a bullish market trend but merely the result of
a lack of perceived opportunities on the short
selling side, has undoubtedly explained a large fraction
of the performance of these managers in the
extended bull market periods of the 1990s.
On the other hand, it has very significantly hurt
their performance in the past few years of market
downturns. Similarly, long/short managers - even
those who target market neutrality - have unintended
time-varying residual exposure to a variety
of sectors or investment styles (growth or value,
small cap or large cap) resulting from their bottomup
stock-picking decisions. Since very few managers
are both market- and factor-neutral, it is not obvious
to extract from their performance anything but a
very noisy signal on their pure stock-picking ability.
Active management of asset allocation decisions
actually can take two forms. The first possible
form of an active asset-allocation strategy
involves adding market- and/or sector-timing
alpha benefits to original stock-picking-based
decisions. Long/short managers can also choose
to use market-, sector- or style-timing as an alternative
way to generate alpha in the absence of
confidence in their ability to have consistent performance
through stock-picking.
In the paper entitled 'Portable Alpha and
Portable Beta Strategies in the Euro Zone - Implementing
Active Asset Allocation Decisions using
Equity Index Options and Futures', forthcoming
in the Journal of Portfolio Management, we show
how to construct a pure overlay portfolio that is
designed to capture excess return through tactical
asset- and factor-allocation decisions on the European
markets, using active management of betas
to generate (portable) alphas. We focus on pure
active allocation decisions implemented through
trading in index derivatives markets so as to
study the performance of an overlay strategy
that is not impacted by stock-picking decisions,
which should remain the sole focus of attention
from bottom-up managers.
In the following table, extracted from the paper
to which the reader is referred for further details,
can be found we show, among others, the results
obtained in the case of an absolute return
strategy (benchmark: 1 month Libor) implementing
a tactical asset allocation (long or short
bets on the DJ EuroStoxx50 index using futures
contracts) with a gross leverage fluctuating from
1 to 2 (net leverage from 0 to 1). The differences
observed between the two experiments lie in the
fees (monthly management fees: 0.075%, monthly
administration fees: 0.045%) taken into account
in the second back test.
FROM 07/2000 TO 06/2003
BENCHMARK = LIBOR 1 MONTH
Ref Ptf LiborBack Test 1 Back Test 2
Cumulative Return 12.12% 27.52% 22.98%
Annualised Return 3.82% 8.28% 7.07%
Annualised Std Deviation 0.25% 5.55% 5.57%
Sharpe - 0.80 0.58
% Negative Returns - 13.89% 16.67%
Worst Monthly Drawdown - -3.39% -3.04%
The economic significance of the timing strategy
can be seen from the overperformance of the
portfolio. For example, in the the above-mentioned
absolute-return strategy with a benchmark
100% invested in cash, the annual performance is
a solid 8.28% (respectively 7.07% fees included)
for a 5.55% (respectively 5.57% fees included)
standard deviation. We could favorably compare
such a performance with that of a typical marketneutral
hedge fund.
The second possible form of an active assetallocation
strategy involves implementing an
option-based portfolio strategy, of which the sole
objective is to modify the asset-allocation risk
profile in the portfolio. In particular, options on
equity indices can be used to truncate return distributions
with the aim of eliminating the few
worst (and best) outliers generated from managers'
forecast errors. In the paper we refer to, we
show how suitably designed option strategies can
be used to enhance the performance of a markettiming
strategy, the objective being to design a
programme that would consistently add value
during the trendless periods, which are typically
not favorable to timing strategies.
There are actually a number of reasons why
this is the case. First, it is obviously easier to predict
significant market moves, as opposed to
small changes in trends that can easily be confused
with noise. Besides, if the market experiences
a series of short-term reversals within the
one-month time frame, the model's prediction,
based on the previous month's data, will fail to
forecast the right direction. Finally, even if the
model yields correct predictions, they are of little
use if the spread of the risk-asset return over the
risk-free rate is small. All these reasons explain
why even a well-designed TAA strategy usually
performs poorly (only slightly better than the
risk-free rate) in periods of low volatility.
For the strategy to perform well in periods of
low volatility, one of the best techniques consists
of implementing short positions in options.
Assume the DJ EuroStoxx50 index is at a (normalised)
100 level. Let us further assume we sell a
call option with a 110 strike and a put option with
a 90 strike price. Such a strategy, which is known
as a 'top strangle', allows an investor to take a
short position on volatility. If the market goes
through a calm period so that the index price
remains within the 90-110 range, none of the
options will be exercised and the option portfolio
will generate a profit due to the time-decay. Intuitively,
the profit comes from the loss in value of
unexercised options as they come close to maturity.
While this portfolio of short options should
add performance in trendless periods when TAA
strategies generally do not outperfom dramatically,
it remains, on the other hand, the risk of one
option being exercised in case of a large change
in the index value. Should this happen, the profitability
of the underlying TAA strategy would
be significantly impacted.
In an attempt to add the benefits of risk reduction
to the benefits of return enhancement, we
can notably choose to hedge the risk associated to
the short option positions by adding long positions
in further out-of-the-money options. To get
back to the previous example, we would buy a
call option with say a 120 strike price and a put
option with say a 80 strike price. Such a strategy
is known as a 'bottom strangle'. If these options
are chosen to be of longer maturity (eg, 45-90
days versus 30-35 days), then the net theta of the
option portfolio would be positive and the
strategy would still profit from the time decay,
while adding a protection to the underlying TAA
position in case the index goes below 80 or above
120 in our example.
To demonstrate the interest of this approach,
we have implemented an option overlay strategy
by selecting options on the DJ EuroStoxx50 index
with strike prices symmetrically distributed
around the at-the-money level. The decision rule
that we have systematically applied is as follows:
• For each month m, short-term (i.e.,
expiring in month m+1) call and put options
to be sold have been chosen so that the strike
price is the closest to current index price +50
(case of a call option) or current index price -
50 (case of a put option). For each month m,
longer-term (ie, expiring in month m+2) call
and put options to be purchased have been
chosen so that the strike price is the closest
to the current index price +100 (case of a call
option) or current index price -100 (case of a
put option).
• The quantities in the top and bottom
strangle strategies have been optimised so as
to maximise the net theta of the overall position,
while at the same time satisfying a euroneutrality
constraint.
We have then selected the scale of the option
overlay strategy so as to make it commensurate
with the scale of the underlying TAA strategy.
For example, the average leverage of the TAA
portfolio is 1.17 over the period. We have
designed the size of the option overlay strategy
so that the leverage is equal to that number, up to
rounding errors. We have obtained theta and delta
estimates by using the Black-Scholes model after
extracting an implied volatility estimate from
options settlement prices. We have then performed
a systematic rebalancing at the beginning
of each month, i.e. positions at the beginning of
month m systematically closed out at the beginning
of month m+1 using the settlement prices.
The following table, extracted from the paper
to which the reader is referred for more details,
contains an overview of the results obtained
through this experiment. The previous experiment
(see 'back test 2') corresponds to the results
shown above right in column 'TAA w/o Options.
Both experiments with and without options
include management and administration fees over
a 36-month period.
IMPACT OF ADDING AN OPTION
OVERLAY STRATEGY
FROM 07/2000 TO 06/2003
Bnchmrk LiborTAA w/optionsTAA w/o Options
Cumulative Return 12.12% 27.51% 22.98%
Annualised Return 3.82% 8.28% 7.07%
Annualised Std Deviation 0.25% 5.58% 5.57%
Sharpe NA 0.80 0.58
Downside Risk (3.00%) NA 4.78% 4.46%
Sortino (3.00%) NA 1.10 0.91
% Negative Returns NA 13.89% 16.67%
As can be seen from this second table, the TAA
performance can be further improved by using an
option overlay portfolio as a portable beta
vehicle. In particular, we show that suitably
designed option strategies would have added 121
basis points in terms of average returns, without
increasing the level of risk (annualised volatility:
5.58% versus 5.57%; downside deviation [3%]:
4.78% versus 4.46%; negative months: 13.89%
versus 16.67%).
We can therefore draw the conclusion that the
option overlay strategy acts as a real return
enhancer while reducing the negative outliers
(peak-to-valley: -3.18% versus -3.54% without
options; worst monthly drawdown: -2.95% versus
-3.04% without options).
Noël Amenc, Philippe
Malaise and Lionel
Martellini are
professors in finance at
EDHEC Graduate
School of Business.
Daphné Sfeir is a senior
research engineer at
EDHEC Risk and Asset
Management Research
Center.The author for correspondence is
Philippe Malaise (e-mail address:
philippe.malaise@edhec.edu).The authors
wish to thank Elizabeth Regan and Brendan
Bradley for very useful comments.This
research has been sponsored by Eurex.
Key Points
Bottom-up security selection decisions often
have dramatic and unintended impacts on
portfolio returns
Suitably designed option strategies can be used
to enhance the performance of a markettiming
strategy
The option overlay strategy acts as a real
return enhancer while reducing the negative
outliers
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